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Abstract
This interpretive grounded theory study explains
how the early-stage mobile game startups excel in the
market after releasing their apps. The data was
collected by interviewing 20 startups in an accelerator
operated by a platform owner. Our model shows that
the startups follow an experimentation approach that
allows for discovery of areas of improvement as well
new potential markets. They monitor the performance
of their games in order to better understand how to
excel in the market. Accordingly, they continuously
improve their games and expand to new markets to
meet their success objectives despite the possible
restraints imposed on them by the platform owner and
available analytics tools. Our study enriches the
existing literature on mobile app development by
startups, their success, and how the platform owner
through the accelerator can affect the startups in
succeeding.

1. Introduction
Mobile application (app) platforms have enabled a
large number of third-party application (app)
developers to create and distribute their mobile apps to
the smartphone users with economic motivations [9].
They can distribute their apps through the digital
market places, also called “app stores”. Consequently,
many types of apps are available on the app stores,
with games comprising the largest category [17].
In spite of the opportunities, the app developers
face some challenges in working on the platforms.
They are responsible for the sales of their apps in
addition to their technical development [9]. This
requires them to have both technical and business
knowledge about the markets, users, mobile devices
and platforms at a global scale [1]. Moreover, they
need to adhere to the rules of the platform owner
regarding the platform control and app store design and
mechanisms [9] [24].
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Many of the app developers are independent
startups [24] and need to cope with the lack of
experience and shortage of resources in designing their
products, markets and business models in a way to
quickly scale up [22]. Mobile game startups face some
context-specific challenges as well, due to the nature of
their product and the more intense competition in the
game category compared with other apps [32]. Game
players are heterogenous in their expectations, and may
not be able to define exactly what they want in advance
[15]. Because the players have a great number of
alternative games to choose from, they are not willing
to wait long for any problems in a game to be fixed
[32]. Moreover, games have the highest chance to
attract the users and get on top ranking lists right upon
their release time [31]. Creating a game with appeal to
mass market and the ability to attract users and
encourage them to continue playing is critical for the
game developers.
Generally, to cope with market uncertainties and to
avoid investing in a software product with little or no
market appeal, startups are advised to follow the
experimentation approach in their product development
according to the lean principles [25]. They develop the
products in iterations by measuring and learning from
the users’ feedbacks along the development period and
adjusting the product accordingly. However, in the
highly competitive global app market, the developers
gain access to their users only after publishing the app
on the platform [1], and that coincides with the time of
the highest chance of receiving publicity and
consequently, the app getting downloaded [31].
Therefore, it is critical for the app developers to define,
on one hand, what needs to be offered at the launch
time so that the already attracted users are not lost, and
on the other hand, what can be experimented with and
adapted to the users’ expectations and the market.
To accelerate the market adaptation of their app,
some startups participate in business accelerator
programs to receive funding and training [4]. Some
accelerators are affiliated with a company and called
“corporate accelerators” [23]. Despite the mutual
benefits, there can be some conflicts of interest related
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to objectives and values between the startups and the
accelerator that need to be resolved [14].
The extant literature has discussed the challenges
that app developers face in working on platforms in
terms of competition and platform-owner’s role.
However, there is still very little research on
understanding how the app developers cope with
challenges in offering a product with appeal to users,
and the attention is given to the development phase
before publishing the apps (e.g. [24]). Hence, in this
paper, we answer the research question of “How do the
early-stage mobile game startups excel in the market?”.
Our focus is on the post-launch activities of the
startups, and the role of the platform owner in shaping
these post-launch activities for the startups.
Our findings are from an empirical study with 20
early-stage mobile game startups that participated in an
accelerator program organized by a platform owner.
We collected our data by semi-structured interviews
with the startups and used a classic grounded theory
methodology (GTM) (e.g. [19]). We contribute to the
literature on software startups and how they
experiment in finding the market-product fit to
succeed, with particular focus on mobile game
developers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In the next section, we present our literature review.
Then we introduce the research setting and describe the
research method. In the fourth section, we present the
findings and continue in section five to discuss them in
light of the literature. Finally, we conclude with a
summary of the implications of study to theory and
practice, and suggest avenues for future research.

2. Literature Review
Following the classic GTM tradition, we present
the preliminary literature review [12] in this section.
We reviewed the relevant streams of research to our
context; i.e. mobile app development, software startups
and business accelerators. The purpose of preliminary
literature review is to have theoretical sensitivity about
the existing knowledge without imposing the literature
on data analysis. Later on, when concepts emerged
from the empirical data, we conducted the theoretical
integration by employing additional literature in the
form of the extended literature [28] to discuss the
concepts.

2.1. Mobile application development
Mobile application platforms connect multiple
distinct groups of actors [2], including app users and
app developers. These platforms allow third-party
developers to create additional services and contents in

the form of apps, and distribute them to the users
through the app stores. The platform owners control
the platforms with boundary resources through
resourcing and securing mechanisms. Boundary
resources are “the software tools and regulations that
serve as the interface for the arm’s-length relationship
between the platform owner and the application
developer” [8: 174]. Resourcing means extending the
scope and diversity of the platform and supporting the
app development and securing refers to controlling the
developed apps to prevent the platform from infringing
changes. The app developers may also engage in selfresourcing by designing their own boundary resources.
Operating on the platforms creates both
opportunities and challenges for the developers.
Platforms provide access to a global mass of mobile
users to whom the apps can be distributed while
sharing the possible app revenue with the platform
owner. While many developers seek economic benefits
by creating apps [9][2], the intense competition often
forces them to offer their apps for free and to delay
revenue for later. The developer might also choose to
display advertisement in their apps or employ
freemium model of revenue making by offering the
app for free and encouraging the users to pay for
additional features [1].
Furthermore, the market mechanism and the
structure of the app stores with ranking lists are
designed so that success leads to more success. Top
positions on ranking lists have an impact on the
number of downloads; yet, a large volume of
downloads is required for a chance to get featured or
listed (e.g. [2]). Meanwhile, the intense competition
means that an app can stay featured or at top spots on
the list only for a very short time (e.g. [31]) and the
developer may lose the opportunity to succeed if they
fail to capture the attention of the users in the short
period of app store visibility. Generally, the need for
additional marketing activities favors more resourceful
firms [3]. For game developers, the challenges also
include not knowing the exact expectations of the
heterogenous users [15]; and the users’ tendency to
simply opt out a game in case of any problems rather
than waiting for them to be fixed [32].

2.2.
Software
accelerators

startups

and

business

Many of the mobile app developers are independent
startups [24]. Software startups are defined as “those
organizations focused on the creation of high-tech and
innovative products, with little or no operating history,
aiming to aggressively grow their business in highly
scalable markets” [10: 585]. Startups are known to
have limited resources in terms of knowledge, finance,
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and networking, but still need to be able to adapt
quickly to the market in order to scale-up [22]. Failing
in finding the product-market fit and a scalable
business model is a common cause of failure for many
startups [11].
The concept of lean startup was introduced to guide
startups in creating the “right thing” for the customers
[25]. Lean startups follow an experimentation approach
following the build-measure-learn cycle (BML). They
create a minimum viable products (MVP), test it with
some customers, and adjust it according to the learning
from the customers’ feedbacks. MVP is a version of
the product with minimum features and minimum
development time allowing a complete round in the
BML cycle. MVP must be complete enough to
demonstrate the value that it is supposed to offer [18].
According to the results of the BML, the startup may
stay on its current direction with the product or service
or pivot to another direction.
Mobile app developers experiment in simultaneous
or sequential way [5]. In the simultaneous approach the
developer offers a portfolio of apps to the market and
analyzes the market reaction, while in the sequential
approach the developer offers one app and improve it
gradually through updates. Even though simultaneous
experimentation is advised by some guidelines to game
developers and sequential experimentation to nongame developers [5], the scarce resources of game
developers rarely allow for working on multiple games
[16].
One way for the startups to compensate their lack
of resources and knowledge of creating a right product
for the market is to participate in an accelerator
program. Accelerators are designed to expedite the
growth of the startups by providing seed funding,
training and mentoring, and networking opportunities
over a short period of time [4]. Accelerators can be
independent and provide service in return for equity
stake in the startups, or be affiliated to a company by
helping the startups to create products of interest for
the company and/or build an ecosystem around the
company [23]. The latter is referred to as “corporate
accelerator”. Accelerators provide numerous benefits
to the startups in access to resources, markets, funding,
and credibility in acquiring funding from investors
[14]. However, in the case of the corporate
accelerators, the differences in values and perceptions,
mutual expectations, work practices and modes of
operation between the startups and the corporate may
cause conflicts between the company and the startups
which requires resolution (e.g. [30]).

3. Research setting and methodology
We collected our empirical data by semi-structured
interviews with 20 mobile game startups from 13
countries. The startups were working on their first
commercial game and participating in the AppCampus
accelerator program.
AppCampus was a corporate accelerator operating
between 2012 and 2015. It was established as a
partnership between a platform owner (Microsoft and
formerly Nokia) and a university in Finland to fund
and educate the mobile app developers for the
Windows Phone (WP) platform. AppCampus staff
selected the startups working on apps with potential for
appealing the mass market. The funding was offered in
exchange for 90 days of exclusivity period on the
Windows Phone platform. In addition to the funding
offered, some of the startups with apps deemed most
promising were invited to participate in a two-week
intensive training camp called AppCademy. During the
whole lifetime of AppCampus, development of
altogether over 300 apps were funded, and 160 app
developers participated in AppCademy in eight
batches.
The first author conducted the semi-structured
interviews with the startup entrepreneurs during three
AppCademy programs. She also observed most of the
group sessions and interacted with the entrepreneurs
and the AppCampus staff to create a shared
understanding about the activities of entrepreneurs and
the AppCampus. The interviews lasted between 30 to
60 minutes, they were recorded and transcribed, and
field notes were taken after each interview. The
interview themes addressed the background
information about the startups (team, experience,
roles), business model elements about their current and
if any, previous apps (description, target audience,
monetization, and success definition), and their
interactions with AppCampus (experiences, learning).
Collection of rich data by semi-structured interviews
enabled us to comprehend and make sense of the
activities of the startups (e.g. [12]).
We used the qualitative classic GTM for both the
data analysis and theorizing (e.g. [12]). The open
approach allowed by GTM was a suitable choice given
the dearth of research on the activities of mobile app
startups [8] and the role of the platform owner in their
activities [24]. In addition, the classic approach of
GTM allowed us to be flexible and creative in our
conceptualization without imposing a priori concepts
or framework to the data analysis [20].
We conducted three levels of open, selective and
theoretical coding and allowed the concepts to
genuinely arise from the rich empirical data. We read
the interview transcripts line-by-line while assigning
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codes to the length of text that would help in
understanding what was actually happening. [12]
Examples of open coding are provided in Sections 4.1 4.5. The coding process was iterative. Initially 500
open codes were generated, but through multiple
refining and merging by the GTM principle of constant
comparison, they were reduced to 245 open codes.
Saturation was reached when we started to see
repetition of similar instances [12]. We grouped the
open codes into 11 selective codes, five of which
create our emergent core category ‘Excelling in the
Market’ presented in this paper. We conducted
theoretical coding by identifying the relationships
between the selective codes while writing memos to
assist the process. Finally, following the GTM, we
conducted the theoretical integration by grounding the
emergent core category with the use of the extended
literature.

4. Findings
In this section, we present the core category
Excelling in the market consisting of five selective
codes: 1) Monitoring activities, 2) Post-launch
activities, 3) Insights on the game performance, 4)
Success with the game, and 5) Restraints. Table 1
summarizes the constructs of the core category by open
and selective codes.
Table 1. Construction of ‘Excelling in the
market’
Open codes
Focusing on
analytics;
Monitoring
users’ behaviors
in the game;
Monitoring
users’ reviews
Improving the
game after
launch; Multiplatform
activities
Getting insight
into users’
behavior;
Getting
surprised by the
download
volume; Regret
about the past
activities
Defining the
success by the

Selective
Codes
Monitoring
activities

Post-launch
activities

Insights on
the game
performance

Success with
the game

Definition
Activities for
watching the
game market
performance
and user’s
performance
inside the game
Improvement
activities after
publishing the
game
Understandings
related to the
game market
performance of
and user’s
behavior in the
game after
publishing the
game
What the
startups

download
volume; Defining
success by the
revenue volume;
Defining
success by
personal
achievements
Restraints by
AppCampus;
Restraints by
the platform;
Restraints by
supporting tools

consider as
success
definition for
their game

Restraints

The limitations
that were
imposed on the
startups

Next, we will describe the selective codes and
related open codes.

4.1. Monitoring activities
The selective code of Monitoring activities consists
of three open codes: 1) focusing on analytics, 2)
monitoring users’ behaviors in the game, and 3)
monitoring users’ reviews.
Focusing on analytics describes how the startups used
analytics tools that allowed them to collect data on the
users and the market performance of their game. For
this purpose, they mostly used free available tools such
as Flurry and/or Google analytics. They collected
various types of market-related data, such as number of
downloads, uninstallments and active users, user
retention rate, and demographic information (e.g. age,
location, gender).
“We've got about 96 per cent males. So, it's good to
know, like, what kind of audience you're targeting. So,
yes, the geography, ‘Where do people come from?’”
(Startup I)
Monitoring users’ behaviors in the game depicts
how the startups monitored the game players’
behaviors and activities. By observing the users’
activities, insights could be gained on users’ interests
and challenges, and/or usage of the in-app-purchase
features. The startups could use this information for
their future game updates and strategizing.
“[We monitor] useful information, like, ‘How many
percentage the users complete?’, ‘How many levels?’,
‘In which point the users stop playing, and what could
be the reason for that?’” (Startup N)
Monitoring users’ reviews highlight the startups’
attention to the reviews provided by the users and/or
their star ratings. These user reviews helped the
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startups to better understand what their users cared
about and what kind of challenges they had. The
reviews also offered new ideas on how to extend and
improve the game. It was mentioned that not all the
reviews were necessarily meaningful or unbiased;
however, most of the reviews could still be leveraged
on.

4.3. Insights on the game performance

“So, the languages I'm going to go [for localizing the
game] is Spanish and French. I get many good reviews
from the French; they really like it. […] And Russia of
course, because they want it.” (Startup J)

4.2. Post-launch activities

Getting Insight into Users’ Behavior reflects the way
the startups learned about the game performance,
which could be different from what they had intended
or expected. The differences were related to various
aspects, such as the game play, effectiveness of
monetizing, and the reviews.

The selective code of Post-launch activities is
comprised of two open codes: 1) improving the game
after launch, and 2) multi-platform activities.

“Actually, that’s one of our problems, because there
is not much incentive to purchase; because you can get
almost everything for free” (Startup N)

Improving the game after launch reflects how the
startups used the data gathered with analytics tools or
by users’ reviews to improve the game after its initial
publishing. There were a number of reasons for the
improvements, including the aims of increasing the
user retention rate, creating more content for the game,
tailoring the game to specific target markets,
improving or implementing new monetization
mechanisms, and fixing bugs.

Getting surprised by the download volume
highlights difficulty to forecast the success of the
game. In some occasions, the startups did not expect
any large volume of download for their game when
trying to do some experimentation for fun or learning
purposes, but the game turned out to get downloaded a
lot. In other occasions, the game was downloaded
much less than anticipated.

“[We are] adjusting the game play, because now we
found out at the beginning of the game is too hard, and
then the ending is too easy. […] We are [also] adding
some enemies there and a few new mechanics”
(Startup B)
Multi-platform activities relate to the startups’
preparations to enter also other platforms after the 90day exclusivity period on the WP platform. Many of
the startups considered preparing their games for other
more competitive platforms already during the
exclusivity period. Monitoring the performance of the
game on the WP platform allowed them to see the
strengths and weaknesses of their games and to
improve them before entering other platforms. The
additional platforms were chosen based on the
potential of success and monetizing according to the
game type.
“It's also an awesome way to soft-launch and get,
ideally, a lot of publicity and a lot of downloads; and
then make the iOS people wait for it. […] We hope to
play that down the line into a great iOS/Android
launch by being like, 'Finally! The moment you've been
waiting for!'” (Startup A)

The selective code Insights on the game
performance contains three open codes: 1) getting
insight into the user’s behavior, 2) getting surprised by
the download volume, 3) regret about the past
activities.

“It was a cool game, but I put it for money, […] and
I was shocked that no one actually want to pay in the
market.” (Startup O)
Regret about the past activities is related to losing
some opportunities to get downloads or monetizing
because of some past activities. These were typically
caused by lack of knowledge about the business side of
game development, resulting in mistakes in, for
example, selecting the target markets, marketing the
game, localizing the game, and/or monetizing.
“[Our previous game was] totally free. Totally free!
Very non-professional!” (Startup A)

4.4. Success with the game
The selective code Success with the game consists
of three open codes: 1) defining success by the
download volume, 2) defining success by the revenue
volume, and 3) defining success by personal
achievements.
Defining success by the download volume reflects
the focus of the startups on a high volume of download
as their first success measure. A common belief was
that this would enable them create a good reputation
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and also be useful for possible future business on the
WP platform or on other platforms.
“Our success will not be in terms of money. It will be
in terms of downloads, because first of all we want to
increase brand awareness. So, in reality, we’re not
waiting for money.” (Startup M)
Defining success by the revenue volume relates to the
attention of the startups on generating revenue from
their games in order to survive in the game
development business. However, revenue making was
rarely the first priority and an immediate measure of
success. Rather, for their first commercial game, the
startups were more concerned about the minimum
amount of income that would allow their survival than
profit making.
“If we made enough money to make the other game
[i.e. the next game].” (Startup P)
Defining success by personal achievements reflects
some startups’ focus on success in terms of their
experimental endeavors and learning. These startups
considered being able to finish the project and publish
the game as their success measure. This measure was
mostly mentioned by the startups who wanted to
include innovative and experimental features in their
games.
“The goal of this game for us is to see if we can make
like those other storytelling games in the PC game
market; to see if we can adapt it and figure out what's
not working and figure out how we can fix it; to see if
we can find a storytelling model that we can then
launch other games with.” (Startup A)

4.5. Restraints
The selective code Restraints is comprised of three
open codes: 1) restraints by AppCampus, 2) restraints
by the platform, and 3) restraints by the analytical
tools.
Restraints by AppCampus is about the limitations
imposed on the developers by AppCampus, mainly in
terms of timing of different support activities,
AppCampus’ interests, and AppCampus’ change of
strategy. Overall, these restraints created some extra
work as the startups needed to amend their games
according to the accelerator’s requirements. Some
startups thought that the training would have been
more useful earlier before launching the game. Also,
some startups thought that the timing of funding was
not necessarily helpful in hiring the right expertise at
the time of need. In some cases, the goals of the

startups were not in line with the success measures
defined by the accelerator. While the accelerator
training was focused on getting a high download
volume, some startups had other objectives for their
games. Also, some strategies of the accelerator were
changed along the modifications to the platform’s
strategies, creating additional work for the startups.
“Then a layer of the AppCampus are the talks and
the support and everything. I think it's a little different
for us because we are definitely in the art game camp.”
(Startup C)
Restraints by the platform refers to the limitations
and/or strategies of the WP platform that were imposed
on the startups. They were related to the platform
owner’s preferences, and the limitations of the app
store. The startups were required by the platform to
design their game according to the mobile device
hardware specifications and if developers did not
follow the rules, their apps were not approved by the
quality assurance team. Furthermore, the startups were
not able to contact the users directly through the app
store and had to find other ways of direct contacts.
Further, some startups faced problems with the app
store limitations in terms of suitable category for the
game genre.
“On Windows Phone, you shouldn’t have a back
button, because every phone has a hardware back
button. So, they didn’t want it. We would have wanted
it, because it’s better for users; but they actually forced
us to remove it.” (Startup N)
“I think that they should make an option to answer to
users. […] In the game, there is a support button they
[i.e. the users] press and they can send us an email.”
(Startup H)
Restraints by the supporting tools reflects the
limitations of the analytical tools or the development
tools that the startups were using in developing or
monitoring their games. The frequent changes with
both the technologies and the platform created some
incompatibility issues between the platform and the
third-party development tools. In addition, the
analytical tools used by the startups did not always
provide the exact data the startups desired and
sometimes they had to combine several tools to capture
the data needed.
“The Unity integrations of the Windows Phone
exporter are still very new. So, we've been hung up a
few times. We find a bug, […] and then, we have to
wait for Unity to fix it.” (Startup C)
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“I get numbers out of Flurry and Google Analytics,
and they're different.” (Startup F)

5. Discussion
The next step is to conduct the theoretical coding
by drawing the relationship between the selective
codes [12] and finally to present the theoretical
integration by using the extended literature [28].

5.1. Relating the selective codes
Next, we present our model (Figure 1) to explain
the relationships between the selective codes as the
starting point for theorizing about how the startups
excel in the market.
Monitoring
Activities
Restrict

Create
Guide

Affect
Restraints

Post-Launch
Activities

Guide

Insights on
the Game
Performance

Facilitate
Shape

Contradict
Success with
the Game

Figure 1. Excelling in the market
After releasing the game, the startups begin
monitoring the market with the help of analytical tools
and the users’ reviews to learn how their games are
received. By understanding the strengths and
weaknesses of their games, the startups can gain
validated insight about the performance of their games.
These insights assist the startups in setting realistic
success objectives for their games. Additionally, they
can plan their multi-platform activities and increase the
quality of their games through post-launch activities.
Game quality is enhanced by increasing the user
retention, offering more content, improving the
existing and applying new monetization models, and
localizing the game for different target markets. The
post-launch activities are facilitated by the monitoring
activities through the collection of game analytics and
users’ review data. In turn, the post-launch activities
facilitate achieving the defined success, typically in
terms of download volume, to pave the way to future
revenue making.
Nevertheless, there are some restraints that affect
the post-launch activities: some analytical tools fail to
provide the startups with their desired data; the

limitations set by the platform owner regarding direct
contact with users can restrict the startups’ monitoring
activities; and, the startups may need to engage in
some additional work in their post-launch activities in
face of changes in the platform strategies, lack of
timely support from the platform, or app store
limitations. Meanwhile, the focus on download volume
emphasized in the AppCampus training and support,
might not be fully aligned with some success
objectives of the startups, particularly those who are
not seeking high download volume immediately.

5.2. Theoretical integration – grounding the
concepts
The findings of this study confirm that early-stage
startups with their limited resources work on one game
at a time rather than on multiple games [16] and that
startups follow the sequential experimentation
approach to improve their games after their release (cf.
[5]).
Moreover, the findings are in line with earlier
studies indicating that mobile game startups develop
their games based on their founders’ own experiences
[21] and beta-testing in small groups. However, there
can be unexpected problems and challenges after
publishing the games. Our findings confirm the
unpredictability of the game players identified in
earlier research [15].
5.2.1. Using continuous experimentation. To reduce
the uncertainties related to the market reactions to a
new software product, extant literature emphasizes the
importance of continuous experimentation [7]. The
type of data collected from users has been found to be
different in various stages of the product development
(e.g. [21]). In early stages, startups use qualitative user
inputs that are deliberately shared by the users. Then,
in later stages of the development, the users’ inputs are
collected in large quantitative data sets without the
users’ control. Our findings show that after releasing
the games, the startups exploited both qualitative and
quantitative data. Besides collecting the data by game
analytics, the users’ reviews were seen as an important
source of improvement ideas and strategy setting. This
confirms the role of users as an invaluable asset for the
mobile game startups and emphasizes the importance
of the human capital in building the business models
for software companies [29]. Exploitation of users’
feedbacks is not limited to the app ideation as
discussed in an earlier study on mobile app developers
[24], but is extended to the after-release improvements
regarding the app artefact and markets. The possibility
to receive and exploit the users’ reviews on the app
stores
creates
a
ground
for
open-ended
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experimentations for the software startups without any
preset assumptions to be validated [7]. Instead, it
allows the startups to discover areas of improvement as
well as new potential markets.
Startups considered offering their games as a
service with freemium model of revenue making (e.g.
[13]). Along the lines of this thinking, we can consider
the widely used SERVQUAL measure of quality in
evaluating the quality of the startups’ games (e.g. [13]).
With SERVQUAL, the quality of a game service is
assessed in five areas: tangible features in the game,
creating empathy with users, assuring the users to trust
the developer, being responsive towards the users, and
reliability of the game in terms of technical design. The
findings show that the improvements made to the
released games were in terms of creating more tangible
elements (e.g. extend the content and monetization
mechanisms) and increasing empathy with users
(adding customized in-app-purchase items and
localization). Meanwhile, the reliability of the games
and the assurance were already proofed upon launch by
having the approval of the accelerator’s quality
assurance team before release. Nevertheless, the
tangible element of game complexity require special
attention before the game is released. If the users find
the game too complex and difficult to play, they may
choose not to play it at all [16].
5.2.2. Scaling up. In the extant lean startup literature,
the main concern for the startups is to find the correct
product-market fit, but the scaling of the product to
markets is not addressed (e.g. [25]). The earlier
literature considers the product and market evolution
gradual, so that the product is delivered to an existing
set of early adopters to be proofed before extending the
customer segment [19].
The startups in our data set released their games on
the platform at a global level. With this approach, they
targeted all potential users at the outset, and collected
global data to learn about specific markets with
potential to invest more. The mobile game startups
exploited the possibility offered by the platform to
immediately scale to global markets at the release time.
Accordingly, they could set their objectives of
investment in potential markets after getting to know
them better through game analytics and users’ reviews.
It is worth highlighting the fact that because of the
mentoring by the accelerator and the quality assurance
approval, the startups were already quite certain about
the performance quality of their games. In the absence
of more formal quality assurance, startups may want to
deliver their games first to a test market on the
platform, for example a specific geographic area, to
make sure of its performance quality [15].

5.2.3. Coping with the platform owner rules. The
startups both accommodated to the rules of the
platform owner and resisted them, confirming the
existing literature [6]. The startups were
accommodating to the platform rules in areas where
they had no power against the platform securing
efforts. An example of this is having to change the
game design to be compatible with the mobile device
according to the platform owner’s wish. However,
wherever they could, they sought ways to meet their
objectives through self-resourcing [8]. For example, to
increase their responsiveness towards the users (a
measure in SERVQUAL), they resisted the platform
restrictions by designing a contact channel inside the
game for direct contact with the players. Moreover, to
cope with the limitations of the available analytics
tools, the startups created their own tools to collect
their desired data.

5.3. Implications to theory
Our study contributes to the literature on software
startups developing mobile games by explaining how
they experiment to find the fit between the product and
market(s) in three ways. Firstly, we answer the call for
research on when and how experimentation is done in
software startups [7]. Contrary to earlier research [5],
our study shows how the early-stage game startups
used sequential experimentation after the release of
their app to compensate for the shortage of financial
resources and knowledge about the markets. Sequential
experimentation process was their means to identify
the areas for improvement and expanding the markets.
Secondly, we contribute to the literature on the use
of the game analytics for early-stage startups. We
extend the contributions of Koskenvoima and
Mäntymäki [15] with our larger set of studied startups.
In particular, we highlight the importance of users’
qualitative data, which has not been addressed before.
Even though the more established game producers
obviously have more resources to be spent on game
analytics, our findings show the value and cruciality of
using game analytics also in early-stage startups in
developing their business and excelling in the market.
While the heterogeneity of users’ expectations is
considered to cause difficulties for game developers
[5], our findings show that the startups can take
advantage of this heterogeneity by taking an
experimentation approach and discovering the right
target markets for their games with the help of game
analytics.
Thirdly, we contribute to the literature on the
relationships between platform owners and startups,
taking place through both the platform-owned
accelerator and the platform structure. We show how
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the accelerator assumed a boundary resource role [26]
with its quality assurance team imposing controlling
rules and regulations on the startups. Accordingly, the
startups, either complied with or resisted the rules.
Their compliance or resistance was guided by their
quality objectives for their game as a service.

5.4. Implications to practice
Our study offers some practical implications for
game developer startups. The startups should concern
the unpredictability and heterogeneous demands of
game players [15][32], and take advantage from them.
Confirming the existing literature (e.g. [27]), the
business model of the game startups should focus on
the notion of fast ‘adaptability’. The game developers
should be aware that collecting the performance data
and users’ reviews, and maneuvering by data lead is a
critical part of their business model. The available free
or low-cost analytics tools can work adequately to
serve the purpose of monitoring and adapting. The
monitoring does not solely apply to enriching the game
content but should be used to guide the startups in their
market investments and strategies through localization.
The experimentation approach suggests to initially
offer the game in English or with a few localization
languages for famous game markets, and then to find
the high potential markets by monitoring the game
analytics and localize the game for them.

6. Conclusion
The main contribution of this GTM study is the
model (Figure 1) and our theorizing to explain how the
early-stage game developers excel in the market after
publishing their apps. Our model explains the startups’
strategy for exploiting the platform-based context to
take advantage of the heterogenous user demands and
to create more content and empathy with potential
users, while accommodating and resisting to the
boundary resources.
Although the Windows Phone platform has
practically ceased to exist, the findings of our study
can be still relevant in understanding the early-stage
startup activities in terms of finding the market-product
fit. While the studied startups were influenced by the
platform owner through its accelerator program, the
issues they faced were not specific to the platform or
the accelerator but can be considered emblematic of
any setting where startups are working under the
platform owner’s rules, with or without an accelerator.
We believe that the process of experimentation as
explained in our study can apply to any early-stage
mobile game developer startups. We do acknowledge,
however, that competition on Windows Phone platform

that our study focused on was much weaker than on the
larger (and still extant) iOS and Android platforms.
Indeed, an interesting avenue for future research would
be to study the early-stage startups in these more
mature platforms and to identify the differences in their
strategies and processes. Moreover, the focus of this
study was on early-stage startups that suffer from lack
of resources and cannot afford to invest in developing
multiple apps simultaneously. Therefore, another
possible direction for future research would be to study
if the experimentation approach as described in this
study applies to the more established startups and firms
with more ample resources. As the GTM leaves room
for modification of the model upon appearance of new
data [12], future research will determine if our
theorizing about how startups excel in the market
applies beyond the context of the study reported in this
paper.
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